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Abstract 
 
This paper shows the cognitive and educational limitations of the official institutional 
discourse to combat match-fixing in football. Recently, after reaching the political and 
sports’ institutional agendas, several reports have been published and official prevention 
campaigns have been launched to fight against the phenomenon. These documents can 
be understood as an official preventive narrative on the subject. The discursive analysis 
of the ‘nodal points’ in which this narrative is based displays a lack of holistic 
awareness of the problem. Many discursive variables that should be part of the 
diagnoses are avoided. Likewise, the narrative is presented with a universal character, 
yet the Iberian cases present evidences that contradict it. Based on interviews to key 
informants and media clipping, this paper shows that these preventive and educational 
messages produced by international institutions and sport organizations are not useful in 
Portugal or Spain because they don’t show the reality about this phenomenon.  
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The Official Football Match-fixing Prevention Discourse as a Cognitive Limitation 
(the cases of Iberian Countries) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
After various scandals, match-fixing has become one of the major problems of the 
football world. The analysis and prevention of this phenomenon was included in the 
agenda of several institutions, such as the European Commission, the Council of 
Europe, Interpol, FIFA, UEFA, EPFL, FIFPro, SportAccord, and Transparency 
International (TI). 
In 2011 the Ministers Committee of the Council of Europe issued a statement detailing 
49 recommendations to prevent match-fixing. On the following year, the Declaration of 
Nicosia on preventing match-fixing was signed
1
. Also in 2011, FIFA and Interpol 
signed a cooperation protocol for ten years, and have published several studies assessing 
the situation. Additionally, the Directorate General for Education and Culture of the 
European Commission has funded several initiatives to study, understand and prevent 
this phenomenon
2
.  
The above institutions agree that match-fixing undermines the competitions’ integrity, 
destroys the sport’s spirit, the values associated with it, and its economic role. This 
phenomenon also threatens the continuity of the sports financial machinery, due to the 
loss of potential investors, sponsors, and television public interest, generated by the 
expansion of the problem. Thus, some educational e-learning programs and prevention 
campaigns were launched. The objective is to educate the several sports actors (players, 
coaches, referees and other groups) in order to recognize, resist and report any form of 
match-fixing
3
. 
Due to the interrelation between all these institutions and the exchange of information 
and collaboration in meeting and events
4
, it can be said that there is a formal 
institutional official narrative about the problem. This narrative, like all discourse types, 
is based on “nodal points” that delimit the discussion5. Nodal points are ideas around 
which the discursive possibilities revolve. They determine a semantic battleground in 
which one can talk about the subject. This leaves out other issues that might relate to the 
phenomenon. Consequently, "the guiding principles that determine the world view will 
play a critical role when defining a particular order and the interactions that play 
therein"
6
. Thus, the guiding ideas determine what is good, bad, tolerable, fair and 
desirable for that particular narrative. As Carver pointed out, “discourse is thus the 
representation of what we want the world to be like, rather than a representation of how 
the world is”7. Therefore, the “discourse analysis does not look for truth but rather at 
who claims to have truth, and at how these claims are justified in terms of expressed and 
implicit narratives of authorities”8. 
This paper analyses the nodal points and key ideas that support the preventive discourse 
of the main institution that are officially fighting against the problem. For this proposed, 
FIFA-Interpol e-learning educational program, SportAccord prevention materials, 
EPFL, TI and DFL & DFB Training documents, and institutional presentation in forum 
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and meeting were analysed
9
. All these documents show a cognitive limited narrative of 
the problem and a lack of a holistic perspective to understand the phenomenon in its 
entire dimension. 
Some contradictory ideas of the official discourse will be then contrasted with the ideas, 
experiences and narratives of 37 insiders’ actors collected by key informants interviews 
conducted in Portugal and Spain
10
. The interviewed were former players, former 
coaches, coaches, former referees, referees, football academies managers, parents of 
junior players, junior players and sports agents.  
This paper is divided into four parts. Firstly, the conceptual problem of the official 
narrative is presented. Secondly, the key ideas that function as “nodal points” and give 
symbolic value to the preventive enunciation are pointed out. These are: 1) organized 
crime as a crime driver; 2) criminal dehumanization of the alleged criminal and 3) fear 
as a preventive factor. On the third part, some data and characteristics of the match-
fixing phenomenon in the Iberian cases are presented. These show significant 
disarticulations between the existing prevention discourse and the reality. The last part 
and conclusion lists variables which are not part of the preventive discourse. Yet if these 
where part of the discourse, they would help to improve the grasp of the problem and its 
real dimension. They would also enable a new and effective prevention discourse. 
 
The phenomenon according to the official narrative  
 
Match-fixing is conceptualized as “irregularly influencing the course or the result of a 
sport event in order to obtain advantages for oneself or for others (people or institutions) 
and to remove all or a part of the uncertainty normally associated with the result of a 
competition”11. For the Council of Europe, the phenomenon is understood as the 
“arrangement of an irregular alteration of the course or the result of a sports competition 
or any of its particular events (such as matches or races) in order to obtain an advantage 
for oneself or for others and to remove all or a part of the uncertainty normally 
associated with the result of a competition
12
. In its e-learning module, Interpol defines 
match-fixing as “improperly manipulating the result or course of a match for 
advantage”. 
There are two main motivations for match-fixing: sports reasons and economic 
interests.  
On the first motivation, the main intervenient are sports actors such as players, referees, 
officials, agents, and/or technicians. The goal is to obtain favourable results to prevent 
drops on the classification, to classify for international competitions, to win 
championships and more convenient opponents at a later stage in the competition. Thus, 
the most likely periods for match-fixing are when the above moments are the 
championships’ defining stages. 
The second motivation, the economic interests, is related to gambling. According to the 
official narrative, this kind of match-fixing has expanded due to the Internet amenities 
and the rise of on-line sports betting agencies
13
. In this second type, besides the sports 
players who are bribed, threatened or intimidated to do match-fixing there are also 
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people from outside the sports’ environment involved, who act as bribers. Hence, 
according to the official discourse, behind match-fixing is organized crime
14
.  
This type of match-fixing related to the gambling world is a new phenomenon that is 
not only related to the outcome of the game but also with occasional incidents that 
happen during the game. The new gambling market not only allows betting on the final 
results, but bettors can also place bets in real time on the next cards, penalties and 
corner kicks. A fixer could therefore bribe, for example, a referee to show a yellow card 
first to a player of one of the teams. This type of manipulation is known as spot-fixing. 
Precisely because of this, TI and DFL
15
 pointed out that match-fixing is:  
 
“an agreement that is made to intervene in the ‘normal’ course of the match in 
an improper manner in order to cause a certain event or result. (…) It is 
important to know that match-fixing does not necessarily involve just the result 
of the match (win, tie, loss, difference in scores) or the number of scored goals. 
Individual match events (yellow or red cards, penalties, throw-ins or corners) 
can be involved”. 
 
Thus, the phenomenon related to gambling is what really worries the world of football. 
It was what prompted the introduction of the issue on the agenda of the European 
Commission, and it is what the official narrative seeks to combat. 
The DFL, on its prevention module used by the EPFL and TI clearly states that its goal 
is to create a clear understanding and awareness about the dangers and consequences of 
match-fixing and gambling addiction in order to protect the players and to improve the 
fight against match-fixing. 
The preventive video Match-Fixing - What are the dangers
16
 warns that while the 
problem of match-fixing is not new, and has been part of the sports’ history, "this new 
phenomenon of globalized gambling linked to the Internet is now the number one 
danger for the sports credibility". The expansion of new technologies allows people 
from everywhere to place bets on-line, in real time in competitions all over the world. 
Thus, this cocktail of variables has determined the conversion of organized crime into a 
business and transformed match-fixing into a possible place for money laundering 
(Interpol e-learning). 
Asia is the place where the higher bets are made. It is estimated that for a match in the 
Belgian league, betting in Asia is about 300 thousand euros, while in a match in the 
English Premier League is about 1 million and in a World Cup match is over 1 million 
euros. Only in the UEFA Champions League 2012 final, the amount of the bets was 
over 1 billion euros in Asia. According to CK Consulting, US$430 billion was gambled 
globally last year, 80 per cent of which passing through illegal operators
17
. For EPFL 
and TI, the exponential rise in globalised on-line betting is estimated to be worth more 
than $700 billion annually
18
. 
Match-fixing is more likely to happen when a sports’ actor suffers a delay in his wage 
payment or have financial problems
19
. Declan Hill
20
 claims that three factors are 
involved in widespread corruption: the players are paid badly; they perceive that their 
bosses –the league or team officials- are corrupt; and there are large networks of illegal 
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gambling. In this case, the bigger the number of months in delay the greater the 
possibility to accept to do match-fixing. On the other hand, there is also the problem of 
low and not competitive wages within the several sports actors, and the problems of 
sports addiction that some players may have in the sports world. Thus, friendly games 
or league games where upgrading in the tournament is being played are the easiest 
places for match-fixing to happen.   
According to Europol, in recent years, match-fixing due to betting was detected in 680 
games, 380 of which were played in Europe. Meanwhile, the monitoring that Sportradar 
has done to UEFA, indicates that of the 31 000 games a year that are monitored, 
suspicious patterns were found in 400 games over the last 3 years. 
Last Federbet’s report21 considered that 510 football matches across Europe were 
suspected of being fixed in 2013/14 season. According to this gambling watchdog based 
in Brussels, 110 presents clear patterns of manipulation. During the World Cup Brazil 
2014, there was a suspect about the fix of the game between Croatia and Cameroon
22
.  
Despite this information, there is no comparative data to ensure that the phenomenon of 
match-fixing has increased either internationally or locally. According to Adrian 
Colunga, player of the Spanish club Getafe, "match-fixing has been around forever. 
Anyone who says otherwise is lying"
23
. 
In summary, for the official discourse, the main problem is match-fixing linked to 
gambling (legal and illegal). If this would not happen, everything would seem to be fine 
in the football world according to this narrative. However, as will be presented, there 
are other types of match-fixing that do not involve gambling and arise within the 
institutional framework of football and do not enter this preventive narrative.  
 
Nodal points: key ideas, semantic logic, and fictional enunciation  
 
To create the official explanation and preventive narrative, the global problem is isolate 
from the internal institutional football reality, and a limited understanding of the 
phenomenon (based on the premise that the threat only comes from organized crime 
groups interested in gambling) is created. Thus, it is constructed an axiomatized speech 
based on “nodal points” defined by the institutions, which determines what can be 
spoken and marked out the area of discursive possibilities. This leaves out a series of 
discursive variables that are part of the contemporary football world. However, if they 
were included they would modify substantially the official discourse and even 
delegitimized it.   
Following the thought of Edgar Morin, one can say that this is a narrative marked by 
rationalization. He
24
 distinguishes two approaches to human reason: rationality and 
rationalization. Rationality is the ceaseless dialogue between our spirit, which creates 
logical structures which are applied to the world, and the real world. And when the 
world is not in accordance with our logical system, there is the need to admit that our 
logical system is inadequate, and covers only part of what is real. On the other hand, 
rationalization consists in wanting to lock reality into a coherent system and all that is 
contrary to that coherent system is discarded, forgotten, put aside, and seen as an 
Soccer & Society 
 
6 
 
illusion or impression. In consequence, an arbitrary and limited reality is created, which 
replaces the complex and global reality. 
To give a semantic logic to the description, the narrative should provide a number of 
nodal points that frame the discussion and delineate its discursive extension. There are 
three basic premises that give structure to the preventive discourse.  
 
a - Organized crime as the phenomenon driver  
During the launch conference of the project Staying on side: How to Stop Match fixing, 
Graham Peaker, from UEFA’s intelligence department, explained his institution 
position on the phenomenon. In his presentation, entitled “The Approach of European 
Football”, he pointed out that "match fixers are individuals from the world of Organized 
Crime (the Mafia, Asian triads and Crime syndicates)" and "financial reward is their 
only interest." According to UEFA, "the money they use is dirty money; it comes from 
drug deals; weapons’ sale; theft and prostitution".25 Moreover, match-fixers "are 
dangerous people" and the phenomenon "is a form of money laundering”. According to 
Interpol e-learning match-fixers are mainly members of organized crime. In their 
educational poster, EPFL, TI and DPF consider that match-fixing works when 
"criminals bribe people inside sport - a player, a referee or a club official".
26
  
These nodal points exclude other match-fixing arrangements from the official discourse, 
especially those that are promoted by actors from the sports world with sports purposes. 
Or by those who, because of the new situation (financial gain), arise from within the 
sports framework. Thus, the holistic discourse about the match-fixing problem is 
avoided, especially, when match-fixing does not include the intervention of mafia 
groups. Therefore, the problem is placed outside the institutional football world. This 
strategy also serves to legitimize the institutional football sphere, which have been often 
criticized in the last years because its lack of transparency and several corruptions 
denounces against it
27
. Football institutions are presented in the narrative as 
incorruptible agents, suffering from this problem while trying to prevent it. This 
discursive strategy is logical because the inclusion of sports agents as potential 
corrupters and corrupted, without external pressure, will substantially alter the 
discursive premise that sports actors defend foremost the sports’ truth and the love for 
the sport, another premise on which the official discourse is also sustained. 
For example: the central aim of the agreement between Interpol and FIFA is prevention 
and education. According to these institutions, the better prepared the actors in the 
football world are, the more able they will be to recognize and to overcome the tactics 
used by match-fixers
28
. This discourse indicates that match-fixing happens due to the 
sports actors’ ignorance of the match-fixers’ manoeuvres, and assumes that if they were 
informed, they would refuse to participate in match-fixing. Thus, the preventive 
institutional narrative would meet this goal: to persuade sports actors on the negative 
effects of match-fixing. Yet, other discourse form that could account for the loss of 
sportsmanship or an excessive economic (not sports) interest from sports actors has no 
place within this narrative.  
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In addition, to place the world of crime outside sports is to hide or discard the discursive 
line that mentions the personalities related to criminal groups or non-transparent 
activities that have entered the football world as entrepreneurs or managers
29
. 
Moreover, it is deliberately linked to the alleged "criminal groups", which do match-
fixing, a variety of criminal activities. Yet these connections not always are proven. 
Thus, UEFA’s discourse connects the mafia with prostitution, giving it a negative 
connotation when considering it a source of dirty money. It is also linked with activities 
such as drugs and/or weapons trafficking. Paradoxically, the football world links with 
prostitution have been constant and well known. 
Several players and even managers have found sentimental companions within this 
framework
30
. Certain players
31
 have used prostitution services. Moreover, federations 
and clubs have historically provided sexual services to referees as a payment
32
. In a 
survey conducted in Portugal, almost half of the referees recognized the existence of the 
prostitutes offering
33
. Furthermore, one of the key points on the investigation of the case 
“Apito Dourado” was known as the “Fruit Case”. This was the investigation of the 
systematic use of prostitutes to achieve favours in sports, mainly from referees. Jorge 
Coroado, former Portuguese international referee, emphasized the existence of this 
phenomenon
34
. 
If we include these facts, which are outside the official discourse, and maintain the 
narrative logic, the message would be redefined. And we could provide new semantic 
relationships that would change the overall comprehension: 
a) The suspicious people or the ones reported as criminals would only have a 
negative connotation or named as dangerous, when carrying out a non-accepted  
activity by the football world institutions; 
b) The football world would also be a source of dirty money, as it would use 
activities that generate it, such as prostitution; 
c) When using activities promoted by dirty money (which is later used in illegal 
betting and match-fixing and ends up in money laundering), the football world 
would be accomplice of the problem it seeks to combat. 
 
b - Dehumanization of the alleged criminal 
A recurring problem in the studies on violence and crime is the dehumanization of the 
criminal. The majority of the analyses are based on the premise that crime is wrong per 
se and who commits it is an obscure and commendable individual. There is no chance to 
have compassion for the criminal, and one should not try to find ways to justify the 
criminal’s actions35. 
Match-fixing’s narrative continues this phenomenon. Graham Paeker, from UEFA, 
remarked in his presentation at TI event: "Never forget we are dealing with people who 
have no respect for human life"
36
. Yet, this type of comments only denigrates, 
exaggerate and widespread this idea. Here it is done in such a way, as if one could 
establish a criminal universal profile. Interpol also believes there are recurrent features 
on match-fixers: they are cross-borders organized groups and are mobile. 
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The match-fixing promoters appear in this narrative as dangerous people without 
scruples, who want to seriously hurt individuals. Interpol-FIFA
37
, in its prevention 
module, leaves some warnings to their students: 
 
“Fixers might try to get you addicted to drugs or gambling.” 
“Fixers will exploit your vulnerabilities or secrets, and use blackmail. 
Addictions, debts and extra-marital affairs are often used to blackmail 
players.” 
“Beware of fixers trying to access you and form a false relationship with you.” 
“Beware of people trying to get you to share inside or sensitive information.” 
“Beware of offers of gifts, money or 'honey traps'.” 
“Debts or addictions put you at risk from fixers.” 
“The fixers may try to drug you or threaten you.” 
“Once you're caught you are their slave.” 
 
In the interviews conducted with key actors, 18 key informants acknowledged knowing 
of match-fixing cases or of having received proposals to achieve them. Nonetheless, 
they did not suffer any kind of threats or felt their life was in danger by refusing to do 
match-fixing. Even when there were problems, these were not related to threats by 
organized crime groups, but to internal fraud. A former coach of the Portuguese second 
and third division, exposed one case that happened in the nineties, where a technic 
director did not distributed the money he had agreed to get for losing with his players. 
Because the Portuguese football world is very small, the news spread easily. Moreover, 
everybody knows each other and there are codes, even for these sport favours. Hence, 
his story blew up and the technic had to emigrate
38
. 
In the cases reported in 2013 by Marca newspaper in Spain
39
 there is no mention of 
gangsters’ intimidation, who are from outside the sports framework. In Portugal, the 
recent match-fixing history, including the biggest scandal Apito Dourado, does not 
incorporate these variables either
40
. 
In Integrity in Sport, Understanding and Preventing Match-Fixing, SportAccord 
presents a list of match-fixing historical cases in different sports. Football listed 57 
cases worldwide since 2000. The cases come from very different socio-cultural 
conditions, starting from the cases of Albania, Guatemala, El Salvador and Zimbabwe, 
where corruption and crime are common in all social levels, spreading to those of Italy, 
Germany, and Finland. However, when exploring these stories and each particular case, 
one perceives that the cruel profile UEFA promulgates applies only to a small number 
of cases. In most of them, what happened were only cases of match-fixing between 
sports actors, where Mafia did not intervene directly. These were the cases placed in 
Italy in 2006 and in Portugal in 2007, among others. 
In the analysis of violence in the Balkans, Susan Woodward
41
 warns that the subjective 
designation of dangerous and violent to a region or social group brings negative effects. 
These are mainly two: it affects both the spread of violence and the possibility of 
groups, which are not necessarily violent, to choose to use violence on the grounds that 
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there is no better option. Thus, these kind of subjective assignments serve to legitimize 
the intervention of various groups in the conflict, and may mediate all interests
42
.  
Social Psychology’s golem effect also confirms the worse the expectation placed upon a 
group, the worse they perform
43
. It creates a self-fulfilling prophecy; a prediction that, 
once made, is itself the cause of that reality. 
This reasoning is not only wrong and dangerous, as it is an obstacle to the real 
comprehension of the problem and the presentation of useful and effective solutions. It 
is also a fracture in the discourse coherence of the educational programs.  
A former mafia member, Michael Franzese
44
, who is sponsored by FIFA, Interpol and 
the company he manages, dedicated himself to educate young athletes on how not to be 
corrupted. He is one of the personalities chosen by these institutions to educate and 
prevent match-fixing. The real discourse semantics should then be: a gangster has no 
heart or scruples; he is a dangerous person who is not interested in the individuals’ life. 
Yet, every time he is on the opposite side, and decides to collaborate with what the 
institutions that define the official preventive narrative consider a good cause, he fills 
his soul with love, usefulness, intelligence and love for the others. 
Moreover, Franzese discourse is also a point that should modify the discursive logic, as 
it implies that, once inside the Mafia one can leave it smoothly, and go back to do a 
normal life, where one can even achieve recognition and prestige speaking against the 
organized crime. Thus, the same should happen to an athlete involved in match-fixing. 
On the other hand, if criminals are such dangerous individuals as the narrative 
describes, then the institutional problem worsens because there is extensive research 
devoted to enumerate the links between institutions that govern football or some 
football clubs, with people connected with mafia groups, leaders of clubs with turbulent 
past or present, and high football employees dedicated to enjoy their power positions to 
do illegal business, influence peddling or corruption
45
. 
Interpol explains in its prevention module that: 
 
Where there is a possibility and opportunity to make money illegally, criminals 
will get involved.  The football world has seen a massive growth in the amount 
of money invested – and generated by- the sport. This has attracted the 
attention of people for whom football is a vehicle to make money illegally. 
Many criminals are keen to involve themselves in match-fixing attempts
46
  
 
Thereby, as Andrew Jennings
47
 has already denounced, and recent scandals have shown, 
several FIFA executives have used football as a vehicle for earning money illegally. 
This underlines a discursive logical conclusion. However, for this limited discursive 
logic, the crime itself is not the problem, it is not the danger. Also judicial sentences do 
not matter. What these institutions seem to question are those crimes which come from 
outside institutional football sphere and do not benefit people from inside institutional 
football sphere. Moreover, by putting the core of the dangers and incentives for fixing 
matches outside the football sphere, the narrative avoid and does not need to talk about 
the lack of ethic, transparency and integrity in the football governmental institutional 
sphere that were denounced.  
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Finally, a new discursive incoherence in Interpol and SportAccord prevention videos 
can be pointed out. After Franzese intervention, the former CIA agent Joe Pistone 
considers that it is not nice to see an athlete who you think is in the top of the world 
being wrapped up by a mafia member who “maybe have a fifth grade education”. For 
Pistone, an athlete contacted to fix a match is “a big star, everybody knows who he is”, 
but in front of a mafia guy he shakes like “jelly”48.  
Again, this discourse seeks to universalize its message based on Manichean stereotypes 
such as: the bad is inferior and the good is unbeatable; the corrupt mafia member did 
not finish school; the athlete is a fearful rising start who is corrupted. Thus, the first 
discursive problem is to consider the lack of schooling as a negative issue: the majority 
football stars have a low educational level and come from poor neighbourhoods, where 
people are used to live in violent prone contexts frequented by mafia members. The 
cases of South American players, Eastern Europe or the African countries exemplify 
this issue. Surely, the North American reality is different, as the professional leagues 
recruit players from the college leagues. In consequence, some interviewers in the 
prevention campaigns are talking about a problem and a reality that they do not know.  
Second, the players who have been linked to match-fixing in recent years are far from 
being famous "stars". For example, the Belgian goalkeeper Cliff Mardulier, whose story 
is part of the prevention video, is by no means a globally recognized football player. 
Most cases listed by SportAccord
49
 follow the same logic, thus, the discourse does an 
incorrect generalization. 
To finalize there is another serious problem. Pistone looks to discredit the mafia 
members in his approach. Yet, the proposition “lack of education” is discursively linked 
to ignorance. This creates two problems in the narrative plausibility. First, there is an 
alleged "ignorant former-mafia member" like Franzese, who is used as a teaching bridge 
to understand the problem and prevent it. He is also speaking prior to Pistone’s 
intervention. Thus, it looks like the campaign creators did not understand much about 
discursive logic. Second, in historical terms, the Iberian case has not presented recurring 
match-fixing events with non-educated mafia members’ interference. On the contrary, 
many match-fixers are individuals, who are educated, well off, socially respected, and 
who are also in charge of political and sports’ institutions. Such are the cases of the 
President of Porto Club, Jorge Pinto da Costa; the former president of the Portuguese 
Professional Football League, Valentim Loureiro, who is also a former soldier and 
politician; and the former head of Hércules, Enrique Ortiz, among others
50
. 
 
c - Fear as a preventive factor 
The preventive discourse should be convincing enough to persuade the potential actors 
to not realize the act that the discourse seeks to prevent. Hence, the preventive logic 
must base its persuasive strength in a credible incentive, easy to be apprehended and 
understood by the recipient individuals. In this sense, the match-fixing prevention 
discourse presents a new weak point. Instead of educating individuals towards a better 
society, through a comprehensive analysis of the situation and the ethics’ role in the 
establishment of social unrest, the preventive discourse seeks to frighten the athletes, 
threatening them with a cruel and painful career end. 
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"If I am an athlete, and I have any connection or any approach by a mafia guy, I’ll be 
very concerned", says former undercover agent Joe Pistone in the prevention module
51
. 
Interpol uses the same testimony in its prevention material as well. "There are many 
cases of football players and their families and friends being physically threatened”, 
considered Graham Paeker. 
Interpol-FIFA and SportAccord prevention materials present the story of Cliff 
Mardulier’s, the Belgian goalkeeper, who participated in match-fixing and lost his 
career. According to the goalkeeper, the problem began when his team started to be 
indebted to the players. Players did not receive their wages and the situation started to 
become difficult. Finally, a Chinese who was interested in purchasing the club came, 
but the club was too expensive due to its location in the championship, at the sixth 
position. So, the businessman strategy was to make the team lose some games in order 
to downgrade its place on the classification, lowering the club’s price. In exchange he 
promised to pay all the due wages. Another key motivation was the coach 
encouragement for the players to realize match-fixing. Thus, the players did match-
fixing several times. According Mardulier, when the players wanted to end the farce and 
refused to continue to do match-fixing, the businessman grabbed the gun, pointed it at 
him and told him if they did not lose that night they are going to have “real problems”52.  
Furthermore, in the same educational material, Franzese assures he knows cases of 
athletes that end in a hospital or were handicapped “in a way that they couldn’t play 
again”53. This unfortunately situations are logical to Franzese because “if you have to 
use the threat of violence or violence itself then you do it”54. 
According to the Interpol educational module, used by several institutions which offer 
preventive campaigns on the phenomenon, “once referees/players accept the match-
fixers’ offer or become involved with the match-fixer, they will be defenceless and 
under their complete control”… so “once you give in, you are under their control” 
(Prevention module) thus, according to the narrative, if you are an athlete and you get 
involved with a match-fixer, you become an slave of the fixers
55
. 
For the fear rhetoric to work, the recipient must correspond to someone who is 
vulnerable to such threats. Thus, another discourse point, which is problematic, is the 
athlete’s conceptualization as someone who is naive, fearful and lonely. Franzese states 
with certain distrust in the prevention module:  
 
You would be surprised on how innocent they are (…). They know what they 
do on the field, but they are very innocent in the gambling business (…). They 
are pretty easy to exploit
56
.  
 
In consequence, it is possible to see again the same prejudice and disdain that was seen 
in Pistone’s statements about athletes shaking like a flan where they are in front of a 
mafia fixer. 
If there is any reliable information that contradicts this discursive premise, then the 
narrative automatically loses its credibility. This is the problem of using the fear logic to 
mobilize the discourse recipients. There are many well-known examples that 
demonstrate that this narrative is not true, or at least completely true. In the Iberian 
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cases, the social imaginary on match-fixing dislocates the official prevention discourse 
credibility: the investigation about match-fixing developed in Spain and Portugal, the 
usual denounces about manipulation of results, and the key informant interviewed have 
never spoken about violence, threaten or physical attacks coming from the fixers. In 
fact, despite the suspects and proofs of match-fixing in football in those countries, there 
are not evidence or denounce of someone who have been handicapped, hurt or even 
killed for been involved in manipulation of results.
57
 The 18 key informants interviewed 
that recognized that have known about a fix game or even have been approached in 
order to fix a match confirm that they never heard and/or known about violence. For all 
of them, match-fixing is something that exists, but it is no common, and it is materialize 
inside the sport sphere, between colleagues or by political and/or economic influence of 
the managers. The main objective would be sporting, and no betting and it would be a 
phenomenon more likely to happen in the lower leagues. 
Hence, public narratives of how match-fixing works in these countries are not consistent 
with the official narrative. Below are some examples. 
 
How match-fixing works in Iberia according to insiders’ opinion  
 
In order to settle an efficient preventive message, it is important for this preventive 
narrative to include all the variables spread in the public opinion. That means not only 
including the explanation for these cases involving organized crime - and where a 
connection with the gambling world exists-, but also those related with sporting results 
or those in which only people from the sport institutional spheres are involved. The 
problem of the nodal points of the official preventive narrative is that they define a 
narrow discursive possibility and limited the reality that enters in the discussion of the 
problem. 
According to Franzese, the method used by the match-fixers was to frequent the same 
bar and nightclubs as the young players. Then address them and inviting them for drinks 
and female escorts. For, when confidence was established, they would face them and 
say: “we're friends, let's talk business”. Then, they would put ten or twenty thousand 
dollars on the table and asked them to fix a match. 
At the Interpol prevention module for players in the lower leagues, the situation 
described is the one of a player, who is contacted through Facebook by an individual, 
who after starting a friendly relationship, manages to convince him to fix results and 
then threatens the player. The official narrative lectures on people, who look to be 
friends with the players, earning their trust and then threatening them and make them 
their slaves. 
 
He would become friends of athletes to get to know their weaknesses/ He would 
supply them with drinks, drugs, and money/ Anything to exploit their 
weaknesses/ He would encourage them to go deep into debt/ Once an athlete 
agreed to fix, He would treat them like a slave/ If they did not do what he 
wanted he would use force. (Interpol preventive module) 
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According to Hill
58
, good match-fixers act in five steps: on the access to the 
environment, on the preparation, on the offer to do match-fixing, on the performance 
and development, and on the payment. According to Hill, the idea is to use the 
hierarchies within the team and to get a player who, by history or hierarchy, is able to 
obtain the support of other team players to realize match-fixing. Hill presents its 
findings as definitive. For the author it is possible to systematize a universal form of 
how match-fixers work. Likewise, it is possible to create a general theory on how the 
drug or arms traffic works, yet this does not account for the dynamics and permanently 
change the activities suffer.  
In the Iberian cases, the ways to fix a game would be different and without the 
recurrence to extortion. There are match-fixing offers, but these are structured as if they 
were a love proposal. And in the cases where match-fixing is accepted, whether one 
party has the victory or defeat, this happens without complaints, retaliation or dangers.  
Below there are 7 type of fixing described by key informants. 
Case 1: The president of a club asks the president and/or players of another club to fix a 
match. He offers facilities for the acquisition of a player in the next season, money, and 
or future contracts
59
. Contacts are made mostly by telephone or through emissaries. If 
the other part rejects the offer, nothing happened and everything is silenced
60
.   
Case 2: Leaders of a team that is about to ascend offered to a player, from the opposing 
team, money and a two-year contract for the next year if he would commit mistakes in 
order to lose. Yet, the contract promise is not fulfilled and the player denunciates the 
attempt to do match-fixing.
61
 
Case 3: Managers and players offer themselves to a rival team to lose, in exchange for 
money
62
. A high position in an important football academy told that he was approached 
for match-fixing when he was coach of a Portuguese third division team.  
 
We were close to the promotion. By the end of the championship, a club 
employee came to see me and explained me that he knew key people in our 
opponent. He can make some diligences in order to make the other team lose. I 
told him that this was not my business and sent him to talk with the President 
of the club
63
.   
 
Case 4: In a football world where what prevails are exchanges within teams; the players 
develop friendships and strong connections with teammates, who, in a given time, are 
on the opposing team. Even players who can be in the same national team are rivals in 
the national competitions. Thus, match-fixing simply occurs due to the tacit agreement 
between friends, that at the time of the match the one in need takes the reward for the 
match-fixing. A former player for both Iberian championships, confirmed that the two 
times in his career he had offers to do match-fixing were through friend’s contacts with 
players. Other 5 interviews, coaches and former player have confirmed this situation. In 
general, the fix is agreed between the team captains and is openly discussed in the 
changing room whether to accept it or not. There are cases in which, due to the fixture, 
players know they will face one of the last games in the season. In these cases, friends 
can decide at the beginning of the championship that the team which needed the most 
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will win –. Two former players accepted that this negotiation often happened but are 
very difficult to become reality. 
Case 5: Another type of fixing can occur when tie is enough for both teams’ challenges. 
The result can be agreed before or during the game. A former Portuguese player 
admitted to have gone through this situation in an International Championship. As he 
explained, this was not a corrupt agreement, but a logical matter because with a tie both 
teams qualified for the round of 16. Other 3 former players have confirmed this. 
Case 6: With regards to the Portuguese case, the suspicion towards the referees’ 
impartiality is a problem present in the media and on the social imagination. During 
2013/2014 championship, in 20 seasons at least one team considered to be affected 
negatively by the referees’ acting. The Apito Dourado affair created distrust about 
referees. According to this case, the corrupt referees received gifts, money, prostitutes 
or better ratings for doing match-fixing. There were also and institutional scheme in 
order to appoint particular referees to particular games. Some public statements confirm 
the persistence of the suspicions. The president of Sporting Lisbon reported the 
existence of an institutional structure that favours systematically certain clubs
64
. A high 
position of Sporting Football Academy confirmed that they also suffer wrongdoing of 
referees in the young leagues
65
. A coach of another football academy claimed that are 
referees that are friend or have links with clubs and assured that he knows how each 
referee will act before the game
66
. Mario Figueiredo, president of the Portuguese 
Football League denounced the lack of transparency in the Council of Refereeing
67
. A 
former international referee considered that the problem is a psychological corruption 
due to the economical differences between clubs. “It is very easy to give a penalty in 
favour to Benfica or Porto, but you have to be very sure to give one against them if you 
do not want to have problem”68. In the same direction, Figueiredo claimed for more 
transparency in refereeing
69
.   
Case 7: Football is a business, and no more simply a game. Coaches and managers of 
football academies denounce the power that football agents have nowadays on players’ 
behaviour, creating a possible source of match fixing. Two agents recognized that they 
are willing to influence in their players in order to defend their economic interest and 
financial actives. This includes convince his players to refuse playing a game, to play 
individually without thinking about the team, to influence the coach. Match-fixing 
prevention narrative lacks a wider comprehension of the potential role of agents and 
third owner partnerships as opportunities structure for match fixing.  
As seen, all these examples do not follow those patterns expressed in the official 
preventive narrative. 
On the other hand, payments of incentive for winning are well receive regardless the 
origin of the money. "If you give me something to win, that is acceptable, but if you 
give me to lose it is not", considered a former Portuguese international player. In 
general, all the interviewed believe that there is nothing wrong in accepting money in 
order to win. 
 
Conclusions  
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Match-fixing has become one of the major problems of the football world. The political 
and sports institutions have provided an official narrative to prevent match-fixing. This 
narrative describes the problem, explains its causes, consequences and development, 
and provides a basis for prevention campaigns. The “nodal points” of this narrative 
preclude the admission of variables which could be related to the problem. If these were 
incorporated, they would modify or distort the official discourse. 
This limited discourse, which places the match-fixing instigation outside the football 
world, and relates it primarily to the gambling and crime world, does not account for 
most of the Iberian reality. In the region, match-fixing would be motivated primarily for 
obtaining sports advantages and is materialized by actors of the football world, without 
the influence of mafia gangs and violence. In this sense, this paper is pioneer in 
analysing the institutional preventive diagnostic, while falsifies it with the local 
discursive realities. Given the nature of the subject matter, there is a lack of significant 
empirical data, which difficulties a scientific research on the subject. Therefore, the 
interview techniques used for this article, as well as the contrasting discursive 
technique, are effective in striving for a better phenomenon understanding and the 
materialization processes. Thus, it is possible to construct better narratives, which grasp 
the problem’s complexity comprehensively, enabling the development of new and better 
education and prevention programs. 
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